Geographic Statistical Analysis of the Relationship between Foreign Aid and Foreign Investment by Dr Michael Nicholson
Journal of Economics and Development Studies 
June 2014, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 499-520 
ISSN: 2334-2382 (Print), 2334-2390 (Online) 
Copyright © The Author(s). 2014. All Rights Reserved. 




Geographic Statistical Analysis of the Relationship between 
Foreign Aid and Foreign Investment 
 
 







Global demarcations exist between development aid and foreign direct investment. 
In some core areas, however, certain cross-regional patterns are quite strong relative 
to trends in other regions. Rigorous statistical analysis that contrasts the relative 
influences of time-series panel data clusters “super-regions” with otherwise widely 
varying characteristics,  classified as either “aid-oriented” or “investment-oriented” 
regions. As stated explicitly when setting out the identification strategy below, this 
paper is agnostic as to whether “aid causes growth” or “investment causes growth.” 
We are quite vigorous, however, in analyzing whether and when aid might “cause” 
investment. A series of Granger causality tests that incorporate recent innovations in 
the analysis of heterogeneous panel data demonstrate that global demarcations exist 
between foreign aid and foreign investment that differ substantially among various 
regions. Evidence-based support for international development policy should 
appropriately account for these cross-region similarities when developing policies on 
the incentives for foreign investment and market-based economic growth. 
 
 
Keywords: foreign aid, foreign direct investment, panel data, cointegration 
 





Regional demarcations exist between development aid and foreign direct 
investment. In some core areas, however, certain cross-regional patterns are quite 
strong relative to trends in other regions.  
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Rigorous statistical analysis that contrasts the relative influences of time-series 
panel data clusters countries into “super-regions” with otherwise widely varying 
characteristics, classified as either aid-oriented or investment-oriented regions.  
 
The basis of analysis for the present paper is foreign aid and foreign direct 
investment in the context of economic growth in developing countries. Foreign aid, 
referred to in this paper as official development aid (ODA), has been the subject of 
significant controversy in recent years in reference to the question of whether aid 
causes growth.2 Tangential to this question is whether foreign aid causes foreign direct 
investment (FDI), with an answer common to both that “it depends.”  As stated 
explicitly when setting out the identification strategy below, this paper is agnostic as to 
whether “aid causes growth” or “FDI causes growth.” We are quite vigorous, 
however, in analyzing whether and when aid might “cause” investment. 
 
A series of Granger causality tests that incorporate recent innovations in the 
analysis of heterogeneous panel data demonstrate that global demarcations exist 
between foreign aid and FDI that differ substantially among various regions.3 The 
tests allow for regions and sub-groups to self-identify: that is, the data defines the 
regions. In this case, the data reveals regional geographies, which we label aid-oriented 
regions, including South Asia, Middle East/North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, as 
compared with investment-oriented regions, including East Asia/Pacific, Latin 
America/Caribbean, and Europe/Central Asia. 
 
This analysis incorporates the OECD definition of official development 
assistance as the “flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, 
and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent 
(using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount).”4 We define FDI as net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting 
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is 
the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-
term capital as shown in the balance of payments.5As our focus is on capital flows to 
the developing world, for expedition we refer herein specifically to FDI flows to 
lower and middle income countries as defined by the World Bank. 
                                                             
2 Most relevant discussions begin with Easterly (2006), Sachs (2006), and Banerjee and Duflo (2011). 
See also Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001). 
3Hurlin and Venet (2001), Hurlin (2005), Hood, Kidd and Morris (2008), Fowowe (2011). 
4 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043 
5 See: http://devdata.worldbank.org/query/default.htm 




This paper is not directly concerned with “aid effectiveness”, nor does it 
address popular, controversial questions about whether “aid causes growth” or 
whether “FDI causes growth.” 
 
 We ask the specific statistical question whether ODA “Granger-causes” FDI, 
a concept defined in the empirical section below and based on techniques developed 
by Hurlin and Venet (2001).Section 2 reviews literature that places this question in a 
more general context of whether foreign aid and foreign direct investment are 
substitutes or complements. 
 
 Section 3 outlines the identification strategy and clarifies the underlying 
identifying assumptions. The empirical ansalysis begins in Section 4 with a 
comparison of ODA and FDI trends across regions. Basic statistical correlations 
suggest similar relationships in Middle East/North Africa and South Asia that may be 
more similar than different to those of sub-Saharan Africa. We therefore refer to 
these three regions as aid-oriented. 
 
Section 5 subjects these statistical indicators to rigorous econometric analysis. 
Arellano (2003) provides a comprehensive description of the value in exploring 
heterogeneity across different time-series panels, which for present purposes we 
aggregate to regions of countries. By implementing unit root and cointegration tests at 
the regional level, we find preliminary support for the hypothesis that South Asia, 
Middle East/North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa exhibit distinct characteristics 
among the relationships of their ODA and FDI flows. 
 
The analysis continues with a test of Granger-causality in heterogeneous panel 
data using a three-step procedure described in detail below. We chose this procedure 
to examine the null hypothesis of the existence of aid-oriented regions because of the 
stated feature that the aggregate data sets can define themselves. That is, rather than 
testing an initial hypothesis that South Asia, Middle East/North Africa, and sub-
Saharan Africa are more similar than they are different, we test all six developing 
regions separately. As the data categorizes commonalities, the procedure allows for 
the classification of relevant “super-regions.” 
 
502                                Journal of Economics and Development Studies, Vol. 2(2), June 2014             
 
 
Section 6 concludes with a review of the results, which support the initial 
statistical review that draws the global demarcation in the relationship of foreign aid 
and foreign direct investment between aid-oriented and investment-oriented regions.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
One prominent strand of the relevant literature suggests that foreign aid is 
most effective in “good policy environments.”6Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that 
ODA responds to political variables, such as rule of law, while FDI responds to good 
economic policy, but no statistical evidence that a mutual dependence between FDI 
and ODA exists. The strategic considerations accompanying aid allocations do not 
appear to impact FDI. Private capital flows go to relatively higher income countries, 
which the authors conclude is due to their market size. Presumably, therefore, even 
with good rule of law and sound economic policies, low-income countries cannot 
expect to receive FDI. 
 
Harms and Lutz (2006), nevertheless, find “stubbornly robust” indications 
that foreign aid has a positive, significant impact on foreign investment in countries 
with a substantial regulatory burden: under these circumstances, aid works in poor 
policy environments. In contrast, countries with average institutional characteristics 
yield a marginal effect of aid on investment close to zero. Kimura and Todo (2010) 
identify no statistical relationship between foreign aid and foreign investment at the 
aggregate level but do find a “vanguard effect” in the relationship between Japanese 
aid and Japanese foreign investment.  
 
Asiedu and Villamil (2002) suggest that foreign direct investment could be a 
substitute for development aid, citing Rodrik (1995) in that private capital flows could 
substitute completely for multilateral development assistance, while ODA can also be 
a complement to FDI by affecting incentives for investment. As we show below, in 
many parts of the world FDI has not just substituted for ODA, but has very 
dramatically overtaken it as a source of capital flows. Asiedu, Nandwa, and Jin (2009) 
demonstrate in an empirical analysis that ODA can mitigate the negative impact of 
country risk on inward FDI, but estimate that the amount of ODA would need to 
double (an “implausibly high” level) for ODA to completely offset risks based on 
contract modifications, restrictions on profit repatriation, and payment delays.  
                                                             
6 See, among others, Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen 
(2001), Collier and Dollar (2002), Easterly (2003), Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004), and Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004). 




Bruner and Oxoby (2009) analyze the role of property right institutions, 
finding that deficient institutions impair the ability for ODA to stimulate investment. 
 
 Similarly, Bezuidenhout (2009) uses panel estimates on Southern Africa to 
find a negative relationship between FDI and growth, but no statistical relationship 
between ODA and growth; he does not compare the relationship between foreign aid 
and foreign direct investment.  
 
Karakaplan, Neyapti, and Sayek(2005) investigate the hypothesis that 
countries receiving ODA create direct or indirect (signaling) effects in an economy 
that attracts FDI. Their results suggest that ODA and FDI flow together in the 
presence of good governance and financial market development. In a side point, the 
authors provide a control for sub-Saharan Africa in their regressions, and find that 
relatively higher GDP per capita appears to be related to less FDI in Africa. We discuss 




Implicit in the question “does ODA facilitate FDI?” is one-way causality: the 
question “does FDI encourage ODA?” may only have credibility in the scenario in 
which a multinational firm incentivizes a donor agency to increase its assistance to a 
particular country or region. Conditions on “good environments” related to ODA 
and FDI, however, require the consideration of particular identifying assumptions. 
Substantial volumes of ODA are transferred to countries with the worst economic 
conditions, so the data may interpret the correlation between bad economies and 
rising ODA to say that foreign aid caused the bad conditions. As Rodrik (2005) argues, 
the endogeneity of policy fundamentally affects policy/growth regressions, and 
consequently regressing “growth” on “policy” provides information about neither the 
effectiveness of policy nor the motives of government.He points out that endogeneity 
discussions have focused on “outcome” variables, such as investment, which are 
jointly determined (or caused by) incomes. Clemens, Radelet, Bhanani, and Bazzi 
(2012) recognize the problem that aid often flows into countries specifically because 
of poor economic conditions or bad policy environments, such that aid classified as 
“emergency” and “humanitarian” may have an expected negative correlation with 
growth. 
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Foreign direct investment, however, has been shown to go to good economic 
environments. Alesina and Dollar (2000) identify political and economic determinants 
of ODA and FDI.  
 
They find that ODA responds more to political variables, such as 
democratization, while FDI responds to economic incentives, which include good 
policy environments, trade liberalization, and property right protection. 
Asiedu,Nandwa, and Jin (2009) discuss how FDI and ODA might be jointly 
determined by general conditions in the country. Foreign assistance might be 
provided by altruism or for strategic reasons, with the former including: lowering 
poverty; helping a country meet its debt obligations; or restoring internal balance in a 
country. They find that the multilateral and bilateral donors are both interested in 
helping reduce poverty or heavily indebted countries, but bilateral aid is not as well 
motivated on macroeconomic instability as on multilateral aid. 
 
For a proper econometric specification, the key identifying assumption is that 
FDI may respond to policy environments but does not, itself, “create” a good policy 
environment. We further assume that FDI does not “cause” ODA, although remain 
open to the possibility of multinational firms affecting domestic political economy 
decisions. The analysis herein remains agnostic as to whether ODA or FDI can 




We collected GDP, FDI, and ODA data in both current and constant 2008 
U.S. dollars for developing countries in six regions as classified by the World Bank: 
East Asia/Pacific (EAP), Europe/Central Asia (ECA), Latin America/Caribbean 
(LAC), Middle East/North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SAS), and sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). Table A-1 in the Appendix provides a list of countries in each region.  
 
Figure 1 compares FDI to ODA for lower and middle income countries and 
shows that since 1990, FDI to developing countries has been increasing at a much 
faster rate than has ODA. Until 1992, these countries received more inflows of 
development aid than investment, but since then inward FDI has dominated ODA 
flows to the developing world. In 1990, about $22 billion dollars in FDI flowed to 
lower and middle income countries, compared to about $58 billion in official 
development assistance, and during that time ODA had been about two to four times 
the size of FDI flows since 1970.  




After 1990, however, the amount of FDI to developing countries grew over 
26 times to $597 billion in 2008, before dropping off to $359 billion in 2009. At the 
same time, ODA simply doubled to $126 billion in 2008, rising again to $127 billion 
in 2009, in current U.S. dollars.  
 
In constant U.S. dollars, foreign aid rose from $84 billion in 1990 to $130 
billion in 2009, less than doubling in size. The ratios have reversed, and now FDI to 
the developing world is two to four times the size of ODA flows. Such contrasting 
trends call into question whether the now-swamped ODA flows can “cause” such a 
massive FDI surge. An alternative hypothesis might argue that the ODA prior to 
1990 “set up” the necessary conditions for subsequent FDI flows. 
 




Source: World Development Indicators 
 
As shown in Figure 2, FDI flows to different regions appear to be more 
correlated than similar ODA flows. FDI tends to move in synch across regions to a 
greater extent than ODA in a manner that suggests FDI is determined more by 
market forces and ODA by relatively non-economic concerns. FDI is also more 
volatile than ODA, as the coefficients of variation, in Figure 1 are 1.43 for FDI and 
0.67 for foreign aid. (Coefficients of variation are a normalized measure of probability 
distribution, the standard deviation divided by the mean.) Development assistance 
flows, unlike FDI, did not fall with the globalrecession, and in fact rose in every 






























FDI AID FDI-AID ratio AID-FDI ratio
506                                Journal of Economics and Development Studies, Vol. 2(2), June 2014             
 
 
Note also the substantial difference in scale: sub-Saharan Africa and Middle 
East/North Africa receive far more ODA relative to FDI than the other regions. As 
Asiedu, Nandwa, and Jin (2009) point out, determinants of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa 
may be different than in other regions.  
 




Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Figure 3 disaggregates the data on FDI and ODA flows into specific regions. 
Note the dramatic difference in scales between the two rows of diagrams. For the top 
row, FDI flows approached $200 million in the late 2000’s, while the bottom row 






























































Moreover, the FDI/ODA ratio for the first set of regions (investment-
oriented) approaches 25, while the same ratio for the second set (aid-oriented) never 
tops 4.0. 
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One implication could be that FDI moves in synch for the investment-
oriented regions, while ODA does so for aid-oriented regions.  
 
Table 1 provides some scattered support for these predictions, showing that 
correlations across regions are much stronger for FDI than for ODA but with no 
obviously discernible pattern. 
 
Table 1: Correlations FDI_ODA by Region 
 
  FDI ODA 
  EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS SSA EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS SSA 
EAP 1 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.95 1 0.79 0.92 0.54 0.73 0.79 
ECA 0.93 1 0.79 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.79 1 0.87 0.65 0.79 0.88 
LAC 0.92 0.79 1 0.77 0.78 0.88 0.92 0.87 1 0.67 0.86 0.92 
MNA 0.91 0.98 0.77 1 0.96 0.95 0.54 0.65 0.67 1 0.80 0.82 
SAS 0.89 0.97 0.78 0.96 1 0.96 0.73 0.79 0.86 0.80 1 0.94 
SSA 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.95 0.96 1 0.79 0.88 0.92 0.82 0.94 1 
 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
By this reckoning, a global demarcation can be drawn within the geo-
economies of developing countries. As shown in Figure 2 above, over the past 40 
years, and into 2009, sub-Saharan Africa received the lowest amount of inward FDI 
while receiving the highest amount of total official development assistance. The FDI 
flows are driven by multiple factors, including market size, natural resources and 
political uncertainty. UNCTAD (2011) shows that eight of the ten largest greenfield 
FDI projects in least-developed countries were in “coal, oil, and natural gas” and 
another was in “metals.”  Five of the ten largest acquisitions in LDCs were in “crude 
petroleum and natural gas” with another in “ferroalloy ores, except vanadium.”   
 
Figure 4 displays the share of FDI and ODA by region from 1970 to 2009. 
The three investment-oriented regions show an increasing share of FDI, from a total 
of 46.2 percent in 1970 to 73.5 percent in 2009. Conversely, the share of ODA for the 
aid-oriented regions increased from 57.9 percent in 1970 to 72.5 percent in 2009. 
Note that in 1970, sub-Saharan Africa had a relatively large share of FDI (43.7 
percent) that disappeared to single digits by 1980, but with a share of ODA that has 














Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Table 2 displays the correlations of FDI and ODA share for these six regions, 
along with 2009 GDP shares, and 2009 GDP per capita. The three investment-
oriented regions have the lowest correlations between FDI share and ODA share, the 
lowest shares of GDP, as well as – by slim margins – the highest GDP per capita. We 
conclude that this first glance at the data suggests a simple, but non-trivial pattern: 
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Table 2: FDI and ODA Share Correlations 
 




2009 GDP per 
capita 
East Asia/Pacific 0.690 38.1% $        3,269 
Europe/Central Asia 0.743 15.5% $        6,412 
Latin America/ 
Caribbean 
0.802 24.1% $        7,019 
Middle East/ North 
Africa 
0.822 6.4% $        3,211 
South Asia 0.822 5.7% $        1,085 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.872 10.2% $        1,127 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
5. Panel Cointegration and Causality Tests 
 
Recent innovations in the statistical analysis of longitudinal panel data allow 
for tests of regional variations in the impact of development on foreign direct 
investment. The nature of country or regional data over time allows for differing 
relationships among the different units, but empirical analysis may reveal patterns of 
commonalities. For example, although Canada and the United States are separate 
political entities, information about one country can often help predict information 
about the other. Sometimes, Australia may prove a better predictor of information 
about Canada than the United States, while there may be situations in which nothing 
can predict Canadian responses except information about Canada itself. The tests 
employed in this section help identify the extent that different regions may provide 
information with regard to the relationship between ODA and FDI.  
 
The analysis includes recurring references to “homogeneous” and 
“heterogeneous” behavior in the panel data. If a result indicates homogeneous 
behavior, then all members of a given panel are shown to respond in the same 
fashion. For example, Canada, Australia, and the United States are likely to respond in 
a homogeneous fashion to higher oil prices. Heterogeneous responses help identify 
how groups respond in conjunction. Canada may exhibit similar responses to the 
United States for severe weather patterns (or hockey playoff results) independent of 
activities in Australia, but prove more similar to Australia than the United States 
following, say, shocks to the British pound. 




The results suggest that aid-oriented regions exhibit clear differences in 
comparison to investment-oriented regions: with regard to the statistical relationship 
between ODA and FDI, these regions are more similar than they are different. 
 
5.1 Regional Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
 
We begin by considering the stationarity of the ODA and FDI time series, 
and whether they may prove co-integrated. A non-stationary time series is one that 
contains a “unit root”, in the sense that external shocks have persistent effects – that 
is, in the equation yit= αit + βitXit+ ρiyi,t-1 + εit, the parameter |ρi|=1. Something that 
affects last year’s resultant will also affect this year’s resultant and, by extension, next 
year’s resultant. If |ρi|<1, then the shock will dissipate. As discussed in Banerjee, 
Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry (1993), the short run impacts of the disturbance have 
no tendency to grow systematically over time. 
 
We incorporate unit root tests for heterogeneous panel models as introduced 
by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003). The key insight 
allows for the consideration whether any of the specific series within the panel are 
stationary, while also analyzing if the homogeneous series is itself stationary. Table 3 
shows the results of the Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC) unit root tests, including a 
comparison for the inclusion of a trend.All analysis in this section was conducted in 
Stata 11. FDI and ODA refer to the variables in levels, while delta-FDI and delta-
ODA are first-differences. Without including a trend, the null of non-stationaritycan 
be rejected for neither FDI nor ODA, nor for delta-FDI. The null hypothesis can be 
rejected for delta-ODA. These results suggest that ODA is integrated of order one, 
I(1), while FDI is I(2) or higher. With a trend, however, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity for FDI: it appears that, according to LLC, the non-
stationarity of FDI can be removed by de-trending the data. ODA, however, 
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Table 3: Unit Root Analysis for Regional Data 
 
 
Ho: Variables are non-stationary (ρ=1) 
(6 regions by 36 years) 
 
LLC LLC w/trend 
 
test statistic p-value Decision test statistic p-value Decision 
FDI 1.224 0.890 Do not reject -2.005 0.023 Reject 
deltaFDI 1.177 0.880 Do not reject 5.418 1.000 Do not reject 
ODA 3.794 1.000 Do not reject 2.805 0.998 Do not reject 
deltaODA -5.368 0.000 Reject -4.562 0.000 Reject 
 
If both series are non-stationary, then we consider the possibility of 
cointegration and the introduction of an error-correction mechanism in the analysis. 
If two series are co-integrated, then the shocks to one series will persist in the other, 
and the partial difference would be stable around a fixed mean. In this case the series 
are drifting together (“correcting”) at roughly the same rate; the error correction 
mechanism preserves information about both forms of covariation. Murray (1994) has 
famously illustrated this concept through the story of “the drunk and her dog”, in 
which a drunkard stumbles out of a bar into a statistical random walk. Her dog would 
normally follow a random walk as well, but instead is drawn by the error-correction 
mechanism of its master’s voice, and the drunkard is in turn drawn to the barking of 
the dog. The two series are then statistically co-integrated. We use the panel 
cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999) and Westerlund (2007), which account for a 
potential integrated relationship for cross-sectional panels. Persyn and Westerlund 
(2008) offer the Stata code “xtwest” for the latter, which we thus incorporate below.  
 
 Table 4 shows the results, in which the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
can be rejected for the panel statistics. The group statistics estimate whether the panel 
is integrated as a whole, while the panel statistics estimate whether at least one 
element is cointegrated. As the p-value approaches 0.000, the more likely we are able 
to reject the hypothesis that the series are not cointegrated. By this estimate, then, the 
panel is not integrated as a whole, but individual elements may be. It would appear 
that the regional series might be cointegrated indicating that a long run relationship 
between ODA and FDI exists for some regions, but not in the aggregate.  
 
 




Table 4: Regional Cointegration Tests7 
 
Results for Ho: No Cointegration 
xtwest w/trend xtwest w/out trend 
Statistics Coeff. p-value Decision Coeff. p-value Decision 
Group  
Statistics 
Gt -1.291 0.999 Do not reject  0.083 1.000 Do not reject 
Ga -7.289 0.955 Do not reject  0.619 1.000 Do not reject 
Panel  
Statistics 
Pt -10.277 0.000 Reject -2.659 0.827 Do not reject 
Pa -40.145 0.000 Reject -6.31 0.148 Reject  
 
Table 5 provides results from a cointegration test for individual regions. The 
three regions that reject the null of no cointegration are Europe/Central Asia, Middle 
East/North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, which also happen to be the proposed 
aid-oriented regions.  
 
Table 5: Individual Region Cointegration tests 
 
H0: FDI and ODA are not cointegrated 
Region Test Statistic Decision 
East Asia/Pacific 11.02 No not reject 
Europe/Central Asia 30.14** Reject 
Latin America/Caribbean 6.35 Do not reject 
Middle East/North Africa 24.52** Reject 
South Asia 8.50 Do not reject 
Sub-Saharan Africa 18.59** Reject 
**significant at 95% 
 
                                                             
7 The test statistic incorporates three lags. 
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5.2 Regional Causality Tests 
 
A useful test of Granger-causality for panel data has been introduced by 
Hurlin and Venet (2001) and Hurlin (2005). Hood, Kidd, and Morris (2008) used the 
test to investigate political party developments in the American South and by Fowowe 
(2011) on the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The basic concept involves a four-step procedure to identify the 
presence of “homogeneous” causality, in which the independent variables on whole 
may Granger-cause the dependent variables, or “heterogeneous” causality, in which 
individual elements are assessed regarding the presence of Granger-causality. The 
Hurlin and Venet methodology incorporates information from the entire panel for 
the assessment of individual patterns and develops F test statistics based on specific 
restrictions. 
 
The basic process involves three specific tests.Test I: Homogeneous Non-
Causality (FI)tests against the null hypothesis that ODA does not cause FDI in any 
manner within the panel. If this hypothesis cannot be rejected then the analysis of the 
two time series can be safely concluded on this point. Test II: Homogeneous 
Causality (FII)is built around the hypothesis that ODA causes FDI in a homogeneous 
fashion throughout the panel. If this hypothesis cannot be rejected, then we can safely 
conclude that ODA “Granger-causes” FDI in a homogenous fashion across 
countries. Test III: Heterogeneous Non-Causality (FIII)analyzes the causality of 
individual panel members, based on information from the full panel of data. As FI 
indicates the existence of some kind of Granger causality, and FII indicates that the 
statistical causality is heterogeneous, then FIII tests against the null hypothesis that 
ODA does not “cause” FDI for specific members of the panel. 
 
Hood, Kidd, and Morris (2008) demonstrate that individual panel members 
can then be aggregated into an analysis to see if a particular subset might represent 
Granger-causality, which we use to analyze the question of investment vs. aid-oriented 
regions. A real virtue of this test is that it allows for regions and sub-groups to self-
identify: that is, the data defines the regions. For example, Hood, Kidd, and Morris 
investigated the direction of “Granger-causality” in the post-Reconstruction American 
South between black mobilization and Republican Party development. The data 
demonstrated clear patterns, with a super-region defined as “the Deep South plus 
North Carolina” demonstrating a different causality relationship between the research 
subjects than other southern states.  




 For the present model, Table 6 opens with the first two tests of the Hurlin 
approach: homogeneous non-causality and homogeneous causality. For Test I, the 
null hypothesis that ODA does not Granger-cause FDI can be rejected for up to two 
lags in the data. These results suggest that, on the whole, there is no homogeneous 
non-causality between foreign aid and foreign direct investment. Therefore, there 
exists causality for at least one member of the panel. Test II investigates whether this 
relationship holds for the panel as a whole; specifically does a homogeneous causality 
flow from ODA to FDI?  The results suggest that it does not, with homogeneous 
causality rejected for, again, two lags. 
 
Table 6: Regional Homogeneous Causality and Non-Causality 
 
Test III then tests for heterogeneous non-causality, which investigates each 
individual panel member while incorporating information from the panel as a whole. 
The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 7. As can be seen, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at 95 percent for East Asia/Pacific and Europe/Central 
Asia and 90 percent for Latin America/Carribean, suggesting that for these regions, 
ODA Granger-causes FDI. 
 
Table 7: Heterogeneous Non-Causality 
 
Test I: Homogeneous Non-Causality  Test II: Homogeneous Causality 
 Ho: ODA does not granger-cause FDI   Ho: ODA granger-causes FDI 
Lags FI Decision  Lags FII Decision 
1 1.6463 Reject  1 1.1943 Reject 
2 1.4129 Reject  2 1.0738 Reject 
3 0.9878 Do Not Reject  3 0.8049 Do Not Reject 
Ho: ODA does not granger-causes FDI in those regions 
Region FIII Decision 
East Asia/Pacific 4.3664** Reject 
Europe/Central Asia 5.0310** Reject 
Latin America/ Caribbean 3.0372* Reject 
Middle East/ North Africa 1.0434 Do not reject 
South Asia 0.3788 Do not reject 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0434 Do not reject 
Critical Values for F(6,36):      
90% 95% 99%  
2.75 3.84 6.63  
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To further confirm the relationship of our proposed aid-oriented regions, we 
aggregate individual panel members into supra-regions in order to identify the 
elements of causation. The results are shown in Table 8 and support the implications 
of the chart analysis above: ODA interacts differently with FDI in the investment-
oriented regions. We conclude that if Africa is different, then western and southern 
Asia are also different. 
 




Regional demarcations exist between development aid and foreign direct 
investment.The answer to whether development aid creates incentives for foreign 
direct investment appears to depend on where the activities occur. We employ 
innovative techniques for panel cointegration tests and heterogeneous panel causality, 
and the data shows that the relationship between the capital flows demarcates a clearly 
defined geo-political marker that tends to trace the Indian Ocean: from sub-Saharan 
Africa, through North Africa and the Middle East, and into South Asia. Rigorous 
statistical analysis supports the classification of an aid-oriented region in the sense that 
for this part of the developing world, foreign aid facilitates foreign direct investment.  
 
One fundamental question not addressed is why this line exists. The question 
“why doesn’t capital flow to poor countries?” could be properly restated as “why 
doesn’t capital flow to these specific poor countries?” Development issues are often 
framed either globally or regionally, with very studies focused on broader cross-
regional trends. For example, Asiedu (2002) asks, “Is Africa Different?” and 
investigates whether drivers of FDI in the developing countries may not have similar 
force in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the very differences between Africa and the 
other aid-oriented regions, or even between sub-Saharan Africa and Northern Africa, 
can help illustrate why they also exhibit similar trends in their aid and investment data 
that distinguish them from trends in Latin America or East Asia.  
If Reject, ODA granger-causes FDI in those regions 
Country FIII Decision 
FDI-oriented 2.7287 Reject 
ODA-oriented 0.7750 Do not reject 
Critical Values for F(2, 36):     
90% 95% 99%     
2.13 2.60 3.78     




Evidence-based support for international development, as well as appropriate 
U.S. foreign policy activities, may benefit greatly by accounting appropriately for these 
cross-regions similarities when developing policies on the incentives for foreign 
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Central Asia  
(ECA) 
Latin America/ Caribbean (LAC)Middle East/  
North Africa  
(MENA) 




Albania Antigua and BarbudaAlgeria Angola Malawi 
Cambodia Armenia Argentina Djibouti Benin Mali 
China Azerbaijan Belize Egypt Botswana Mauritania 
Fiji Belarus Bolivia Iran Burkina Faso Mauritius 
Indonesia Bosnia and HerzegovinaBrazil Iraq Burundi Mayotte 
Kiribati Bulgaria Chile Jordan Cameroon Mozambique 
Korea, DR Georgia Colombia Lebanon Cape Verde Namibia 
Lao PDR Kazakhstan Costa Rica Libya CAR Niger 
Malaysia Kosovo Cuba Morocco Chad Nigeria 
Marshall Is.  Kyrgyz Rep. Dominica Syria Comoros Rwanda 
Micronesia Lithuania Dominican Rep. Tunisia Congo, DR São Tomé and 
 Principe 
Mongolia Macedonia, FYR Ecuador West Bank/Gaza Congo, Rep Senegal 
Myanmar Moldova El Salvador Yemen, Rep. Côte d'Ivoire Seychelles 
Palau Montenegro Grenada  Eritrea Sierra Leone 
Papua New  
Guinea 
Romania Guatemala  Ethiopia Somalia 
Philippines Russia Guyana South Asia (SAS) Gabon South Africa 
Samoa Serbia Haiti Afghanistan Gambia, The Sudan 
Solomon Is.  Tajikistan Honduras Bangladesh Ghana Swaziland 
Thailand Turkey Jamaica Bhutan Guinea Tanzania 
Timor-Leste Turkmenistan Mexico India Guinea-Bissau Togo 
Tuvalu Ukraine Nicaragua Maldives Kenya Uganda 
Tonga Uzbekistan Panama Nepal Lesotho Zambia 
Vanuatu  Paraguay Pakistan Liberia Zimbabwe 
Vietnam  Peru Sri Lanka Madagascar Zimbabwe 
  St. Kitts & Nevis    
  St. Lucia    
  St. Vincent & Grenadines   
  Suriname    
  Uruguay    
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Table A-2 Construction of the F statistics 
 
Test Statistic Null hypothesis 





/[ − ( + ) − ] 
ODA does not 
granger-cause FDI 
for any of the panel 
members 




( − )/[ ( − )]
/[ − ( + ) − ] 
ODA granger-
causes FDI for all 
panel members 
Test III (FIII)  
Heterogeneous 
Non-Causality =
( , − )/
/[ − ( + ) + ] 
ODA does not 
granger-cause FDI 
for specific panel 
members 
 
Statistics based on Hood, Kidd, and Morris (2008) 
 
RSS1: Sum of squared residuals from unrestricted model 
RSS2: Sum of squared residuals with restriction that all slope terms are set to zero 
RSS3: Sum of squared residuals with restriction that all slope terms are set equal to 
each other 
RSS2,i: Sum of squared residuals with restriction that slope terms for element i are 
equal to zero 
N = number of groups (6) 
T = number of years (36) 
p = number of lags 
 
